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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction of this matter is pursuant to U.C.A. §78-2a-3, which states in pertinent part: 
(2) The Cc>urt of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction over: 
(e) appeals &om a court of record in criminal cases, except those involving a 
conviction of a first degree or capital felony. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Did the arresting officer have probable cause to stop the appellant? Question of law 
subject to correctness standard of review. Beehive Bail Bonds v. Fifth District Court, 933 P.2d 1011 
(Utah App. 1997). 
2. Did the State establish
 au of the essential elements of the charge of Resisting Arrest? 
Question of law subject XO correctness standard of review. Beehive Bail Bonds v. Fifth District 
Court, 933 P.2d 1011 (Utfh App. 1997). 
3. Did the appellant have the right to resist an unlawful arrest. Question of law subject to 
correctness standard of review. Beehive Bail Bonds v. Fifth District Court, 933 P.2d 1011 (Utah 
App. 1997). 
CONTROLLING STATUTES 
Utah Code (1953, as amended), Sections 64-13-8, 64-13-21(2) . See Addendum 
Utah Code (1953, as amended), Sections 76-2-402(1), 76-8-305 . See Addendum 
Utah Code (195 3, as amended), Section 77-18-1 . . . See Addendum 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from a verdict of the Eighth District Court entered against the Appellant, 
Bruce N. Moore, on January 17, 1997. Judgment was entered on April 7, 1997, and a Notice of 
Appeal was filed on April 24, 1997. 
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In 1994 Mr. Moore entered a plea of guilty to Assault, a Class B Misdemeanor. At that time 
he accepted the terms of a 12-month probation and signed the standard agreement. On June 8,1995, 
Judge John Anderson of the Eighth District Court found that Mr. Moore had failed to pay restitution 
and ordered on that basis that the probation continue for another 12 months. Mr. Moore objected 
to this extension and did not agree to any of the terms of probation. However, the court took no 
further action. 
On October 17, 1995, Brad Draper, the Adult Probation and Parole officer for Duchesne 
County, saw Mr. Moore while driving down the street, and signaled him to stop. Mr. Draper 
approached Mr. Moore's vehicle and asked why Mr. Moore had failed to come in and sign an 
agreement pursuant to the extension ordered by the court on June 8,1995. Mr. Moore indicated his 
belief that the probation was no longer valid and drove away. 
Mr. Draper then pursued Mr. Moore several blocks to the Human Services building in 
Roosevelt. Mr. Draper also called for backup from the Roosevelt Police Department. As Mr. Moore 
exited his vehicle, Mr. Draper informed him that he was under arrest. Mr. Moore refused to 
cooperate with the arrest and was forcibly subdued by Mr. Draper and two other officers, Steve 
Hooley and Chief Cecil Gurr of the Roosevelt Police Department. 
Mr. Moore was charged with two counts of assault on a peace officer, one against Mr. Draper 
and one against Mr. Hooley. He was also charged with resisting arrest and failing to respond to an 
officer's signal. Trial was held on January 17,1997. Mr. Moore presented his own case at trial with 
some assistance from court-appointed counsel Roland Uresk. The jury found Mr. Moore guilty of 
the charge of assault against Mr. Draper, and of both resisting arrest and failing to respond. Mr. 
Moore was acquitted of the charge of assault against Officer Hooley. 
Mr. Moore has proceeded in large part pro se. He has had a series of public defenders 
appointed to assist him. At trial he was assisted by Mr. Roland Uresk. Patricia Geary, who was the 
public defender for Duchesne County during 1997 was appointed to assist with the appeal, but was 
replaced by Mr. Robert Lunnen in January, 1998. In September, 1998, Michael Humiston, the 
current counsel on this case, took Mr. Lunnen's place as public defender. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1. The entire incident commenced when Mr. Draper of Adult Probation and Parole stopped 
Mr. Moore, alleging that Mr. Moore had violated his probation. In fact, there was no valid probation 
in effect, and no order was in effect alleging a violation of probation. Mr. Draper therefore lacked 
probable cause to stop Mr. Moore. 
2. The state failed to establish a number of essential elements of the charge of resisting arrest. 
The unrefiited evidence was that Mr. Moore did not have knowledge of Mr. Draper's status as a 
peace officer, and had very reasonable grounds to believe that the arrest was in fact unlawfiil. 
3. Since Mr. Draper lacked probable cause to stop or detain Mr. Moore, and inasmuch as Mr. 
Moore's good faith belief that the arrest was unlawful was in fact justified, Mr. Moore was justified 
in resisting an unlawfiil arrest and cannot be held criminally liable for either resisting arrest or 
assaulting an officer in the course of resisting an unlawful arrest. 
ARGUMENT 
I 
The Arresting Officer lacked probable cause to stop the Appellant 
A. Mr. Moore had no obligation to report under Utah statutory law. 
Utah Code, §77-18-1 states in pertinent part as follows: 
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(10)(a)(i) Probation may be terminated at any time at the discretion of the court or 
upon completion without violation of. . . 12 months [probation] in cases of class B or C 
misdemeanors or infractions. 
(ii) If the defendant, upon expiration or termination of the probation period, owes 
outstanding fines, restitution, or other assessed costs, the court may retain jurisdiction of the 
case and continue the defendant on bench probation or place the defendant on bench 
probation for the limited purpose of enforcing the payment of fines, restitution, including 
interest, if any . . . and other amounts outstanding, (emphasis added) 
On June 8, 1995, Judge John R. Anderson of the Eighth District Court determined that Mr. 
Moore had failed to pay restitution, and ordered his probation extended for that purpose. Pursuant 
to the above-referenced statute, probation could not be extended beyond 12 months for any other 
purpose, and that 12-month period had nearly expired at the time of the June 8 hearing. After June 
8, 1995, Mr. Moore could only be held on bench probation for the limited purpose of ensuring that 
he paid restitution. The broader terms of supervised probation were no longer applicable, and he thus 
had no obUgation to meet with the Adult Probation and Parole agent, nor to sign any agreement. He 
certainly had no obligation to sign an agreement extending the terms of probation beyond his 
obligation to pay restitution. Furthermore, Mr. Moore had already made it clear in court that he 
would not agree to any further terms. 
The sole probation violation with which Mr. Moore could possibly be charged subsequent to 
June 8, 1995, was failure to pay restitution. Pursuant to Utah Code, §77-18-1(1 l)(b), 
"The running of the probation period is tolled upon the filing of a violation report with 
the court alleging a violation of the terms and conditions of probation or upon the issuance 
of an order to show cause or warrant by the court." 
Utah Code, §77-18-1(12) states in pertinent part: 
(a)(ii) Probation may not be revoked except upon a hearing in court and a finding that 
the conditions of probation have been violated. 
(b)(i) Upon the filing of an affidavit alleging with particularity facts asserted to 
constitute a violation of the conditions of probation, the court that authorized probation shall 
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determine if the affidavit establishes probable cause to believe that revocation, modification, 
or extension of probation is justified. 
(ii) If the court determines there is probable cause, it shall cause to be served on the 
defendant a warrant for his arrest or a copy of the affidavit and an order to show cause why 
his probation should not be revoked, modified, or extended. 
As the trial record clearly shows, no violation report was ever filed prior to Mr. Moore's 
arrest on October 17, 1995, nor was an order to show cause or a warrant issued (Transcript, page 
212). If failure to enter into an agreement constituted a violation, the court had already been notified 
at the hearing on June 8 that Mr. Moore would not sign, yet the court had taken no action. 
Nevertheless, when Mr. Draper stopped Mr. Moore, the basis for the stop was not failure to pay 
restitution, which statutorily was the only violation he could allege, but rather failure to report. 
(Transcript, pages 208-212) Mr. Draper thus had no valid probable cause to stop Mr. Moore. Mr. 
Moore nevertheless did stop when requested, as is proper when a driver is so requested by a peace 
officer. When Mr. Draper indicated that the reason for the stop was that Mr. Moore had failed to 
report, Mr. Moore rightly replied that he had no obligation to report. (Transcript, pages 215) At no 
time, either then or subsequently, did Mr. Draper allege that Mr. Moore had failed to pay restitution, 
and Mr. Draper did not possess any kind of warrant or order to show cause, as none had been sought 
from or issued by the court. Mr. Draper's authority to detain Mr. Moore thus ended once Mr. Moore 
stopped and communicated his response to Mr. Draper. 
B. No valid probation existed under Utah case law. 
Probation constitutes an agreement between the court and the probationer: 
"It is used when the court has made its determination and exercised its discretion to 
place the defendant on probation. This may be done in different ways, but whatever method 
is used, the purpose is reform and rehabilitation: to give the defendant a chance, as the word 
'probation' implies, to prove himself. For this purpose, the defendant is required to agree to 
specified standards of conduct; and his continued liberty is dependent upon compliance with 
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them. The same situation exists when he is on parole. In either case the freedom he enjoys 
is limited and is subject to revocation for violation of the prescribed conditions. But under 
such arrangements the obligations do not all run in one direction. The defendant promises 
to live up to stated requirements, and the public authority operating through the court extends 
to him the implied promise that if he makes good his probation will continue." (emphasis 
added) Baine v. Beckstead, 10 Utah 2d 4, 347 P.2d 554, 557 (Utah 1959). 
It is clear that while any promise on the part of the court can be implied, the promise on the 
part of the defendant must be explicit. Contrary to the above definition, Mr. Moore never agreed to 
an extension of his probation. He explicitly objected to the terms of any extension at the June 8, 
1995, hearing. At that point, if the court intended to enforce its mandates, it would have been 
obligated to order that Mr. Moore be incarcerated. Since it did not do so, and since the essential 
element of Mr. Moore's promise or agreement had been omitted from the probation, the court in 
effect waived any further jurisdiction over Mr. Moore, and his probation was terminated. This is 
emphasized by the fact that, in contrast to the court, the Board of Pardons has refused to release Mr. 
Moore from the State prison for the very reason that he has likewise declined to agree to terms of 
parole. 
C. Mr. Draper lacked probable cause to stop Mr. Moore. 
Mr. Moore stopped when requested and when informed of the reason for the stop, gave his 
legally valid explanation in response. No obligation to report existed under the probation statute, and 
in fact, no valid probation existed at all under case law. Having thus fulfilled the purpose of the stop, 
he was legally free to go, and did so. There had been no probable cause for Mr. Draper to make the 
stop, and having made the stop, there was no probable cause for Mr. Draper to continue pursuing Mr. 
Moore. The charge of failing to obey a peace officer's signal must therefore be dismissed, as Mr. 
Moore did in fact obey all signals to the full extent required by law. Likewise, there was no probable 
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cause for subsequently placing him under arrest. 
II 
The State failed to establish the essential elements of the charge of Resisting Arrest. 
Utah Code, §76-8-305 states in pertinent part: 
A person is guilty of a class B misdemeanor if he has knowledge, or by the exercise 
of reasonable care should have knowledge, that a peace officer is seeking to effect a lawful 
arrest or detention of that person or another and interferes with the arrest or detention . . . 
(emphasis added). 
The offense described above is not a strict liability offense. The statute requires the defendant 
to have knowledge of two key elements: (1) That the arresting party is a peace officer, and (2) that 
the arrest is lawful. The evidence is clear that Mr. Moore did not have the requisite knowledge that 
Mr. Draper was a peace officer. Furthermore, Mr. Moore's belief that Mr. Draper was not a peace 
officer was not unreasonable. Mr. Moore was informed at the time of the initial stop only that Mr. 
Draper was an agent of Adult Probation and Parole. That fact does not in itself establish that Mr. 
Draper was a peace officer. Indeed, Utah Code, §64-13-21(2) states: 
'"Employees of the department who are POST certified and who are designated as 
parole and probation officers by the executive director are peace officers . . . " (emphasis 
added) 
It is clear from the statute that agents must be both POST certified and designated as parole 
and probation officers to be considered peace officers. It is equally clear from the statute that persons 
can be parole and probation officers without being POST certified, and that such persons would not 
be considered peace officers. A citizen would have no obligation to follow the orders of such a 
person. 
Utah Code, §64-13-8 states in pertinent part: 
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The department shall designate by policy which of its employees have the authority 
and powers of peace officers, the power to administer oaths, and other powers the department 
considers appropriate, including but not limited to the responsibility to bear firearms, 
(emphasis added). 
In addition to the requirements set forth in U.C.A. §64-13-21(2), it is clear from the above 
statute that not all employees of the department are peace officers, but rather that this designation is 
determined by the policy of the department. While Mr. Moore might conceivably be expected by 
reasonable care to have notice of the above statutes, it is beyond all reason to expect that he should 
know whether Mr. Draper was POST certified. Nor could he reasonably be expected to know what 
the internal policies of the department might be. There is simply no statute that would require Mr. 
Moore to assume that any agent of the department is a peace officer, and in fact there is considerable 
basis for him to assume just the opposite. 
As to the first element of the Resisting Arrest statute, Mr. Moore was informed only that Mr. 
Draper was an agent of Adult Probation and Parole, not that Mr. Draper was a peace officer. The 
first element is thus lacking. The second element of knowledge that would have to be estabUshed 
against Mr. Moore was that the arrest was lawful. As has been set forth above, there was in fact no 
probable cause on which to base an arrest, and the arrest was in fact unlawful. Furthermore, Mr. 
Moore had solid reason to believe the arrest was unlawful, which good faith belief was in fact correct. 
The State has thus failed to establish two essential elements of the charge of Resisting Arrest, 
and the conviction must therefore be reversed. 
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The Appellant was entitled to resist an unlawful arrest 
Utah Code, §76-2-402(1) states in pertinent part: 
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A person is justified in threatening or using force against another when and to the 
extent that he or she reasonably believes that force is necessary to defend himself or a third 
person against such other's imminent use of unlawful force, (emphasis added) 
Until recently, Utah fully recognized the common law right of a citizen to resist an unlawful 
arrest. State v. Bradshaw, 541 P. 2d 800 (Utah 1975). This right was severely restricted by State v. 
Gardiner, 814 P. 2d 568 (Utah 1991). In making its ruling, the court relied on the same statute under 
which Mr. Moore was charged with resisting arrest, U.C.A. §76-8-305. (814P.2dat575) However, 
Mr. Moore's case is easily distinguishable from Gardiner in that Mr. Moore lacked the element of 
blowing that Mr. Draper was acting in the capacity of a peace officer. By the same token, if Mr. 
Moore cannot be liable under U.C.A. §76-8-305 of resisting arrest due to failure of the essential 
element of knowledge, he likewise is justified under U.C.A. §76-2-402(1) in resisting a perceived 
assault, and cannot be held liable of assaulting an officer. 
While it might be argued that Mr. Moore had knowledge of Mr. Draper's status once Officers 
Hooley and Gurr arrived, it is significant to note that Mr. Moore was acquitted of the charge of 
assault against Officer Hooley. It is solely against Mr. Draper that he was found guilty of assault, and 
it is clear from the record that any contact against Mr. Draper commenced before the Roosevelt 
Police officers arrived, and thus before Mr. Moore had any reasonable basis to believe that Mr. 
Draper was a peace officer. 
Mr. Moore had no knowledge that Mr. Draper was a peace officer and was correct in his 
belief that the arrest was unlawfid. He was thus justified under U.C.A. §76-2-402(1) in using force 
to resist what he believed to be an unlawful assault. The charge of assaulting an officer must 
therefore be reversed. Were this not the case, any person claiming to be an officer could assault 
anybody anytime, and the unwary citizen would be powerless to resist. 
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CONCLUSION 
Mr. Draper had no probable cause to stop Mr. Moore on October 17, 1995. Mr. Moore 
nevertheless did stop long enough to establish that his probation was no longer in effect. He stopped 
when he was told to stop and left when he was legally entitled to leave, and thus the conviction of 
failing to respond to an officer's signal must be reversed. The State failed to establish Mr. Moore's 
knowledge of two essential facts on the charge of resisting arrest. The evidence was unrefiited that 
Mr. Moore did not know that Mr. Draper was a peace officer, and the evidence could not establish 
that Mr. Moore knew that the arrest was lawful, inasmuch as the arrest was not lawful. The 
conviction of resisting arrest must therefore be reversed. Finally, because the element of knowledge 
was lacking on the other charges, Mr. Moore was justified in defending himself from an unlawful 
arrest, and the conviction of assault against an officer must be reversed. 
DATED this 15th day of April, 1999. 
Michael L. Humiston 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that an appropriate number of copies of the attached Amended Appellant's Brief were 
mailed to Norman E. Plate, Assistant Attorney General, 160 East 300 South, Suite 600, P.O. Box 
140856, Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0856 this 15th day of April, 1999. 
Michael L. Humiston 
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ADDENDUM 
Utah Code, §64-13-8: 
The department shall designate by policy which of its employees have the authority and 
powers of peace officers, the power to administer oaths, and other powers the department considers 
appropriate, including but not limited to the responsibility to bear firearms. 
Utah Code, §64-13-21(2): 
Employees of the department who are POST certified and who are designated as parole and 
probation officers by the executive director are peace officers and have the following duties: 
(a) monitoring, investigating, and supervising a parolee's or probationer's compliance 
with the conditions of the parole or probation agreement; 
(b) investigating or apprehending any offender who has escaped from the custody of 
the department or absconded from supervision; 
(c) providing investigative services for the courts, the department, or the Board of 
Pardons and Parole; or 
(d) supervising any offender during transportation. 
Utah Code, §76-2-402(1): 
A person is justified in threatening or using force against another when and to the extent that 
he or she reasonably believes that force is necessary to defend himself or a third person against such 
other's imminent use of unlawful force. 
Utah Code, §76-8-305: 
A person is guilty of a class B misdemeanor if he has knowledge, or by the exercise of 
reasonable care should have knowledge, that a peace officer is seeking to effect a lawfiil arrest or 
detention of that person or another and interferes with the arrest or detention by: 
(1) use of force or any weapon; 
(2) the arrested person's refusal to perform any act required by lawfiil order: 
(a) necessary to effect the arrest or detention; and 
(b) made by a peace officer involved in the arrest or detention; or 
(3) the arrested person's or another person's refusal to refrain from performing any 
act that would impede the arrest or detention. 
Utah Code, §77-18-1: 
(10)(a)(i) Probation may be terminated at any time at the discretion of the court or upon 
completion without violation of 36 months probation in felony cases, or 12 months in cases of class 
B or C misdemeanors or infractions. 
(ii) If the defendant, upon expiration or termination of the probation period, owes outstanding 
fines, restitution, or other assessed costs, the court may retain jurisdiction of the case and continue 
the defendant on bench probation or place the defendant on bench probation for the limited purpose 
of enforcing the payment of fines, restitution, including interest, if any, in accordance with Subsection 
76-3-201(4), and other amounts outstanding. 
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(11 Xb) The running of the probation period is tolled upon the filing of a violation report with 
the court alleging a violation of the terms and conditions of probation or upon the issuance of an 
order to show cause or warrant by the court. 
(12)(a)(ii) Probation may not be revoked except upon a hearing in court and a finding that the 
conditions of probation have been violated. 
(b)(i) Upon the filing of an affidavit alleging with particularity facts asserted to constitute a 
violation of the conditions of probation, the court that authorized probation shall determine if the 
affidavit establishes probable cause to believe that revocation, modification, or extension of probation 
is justified. 
(ii) If the court determines there is probable cause, it shall cause to be served on the defendant 
a warrant for his arrest or a copy of the affidavit and an order to show cause why his probation should 
not be revoked, modified, or extended. 
